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Why “Corporate” Social Responsibility? 
Separation of Ownership and Control 
•Berle and Means (1932) argued that the separation of 
ownership and control at IPO destroys property 
rights to the publicly traded corporation 
•Therefore executives have the discretion to use 
shareholders’ money for their own or others’ benefit  
•However, executives are likely to abuse that 
discretion, so they should continue to be held 
accountable to shareholders  
 
 
The Explosion of the Atom of Property 
•Berle & Means’ argument rested on assumptions of 
active managers and diffused, passive shareholders 
•Modern shareholders are anything but diffused or 
passive 
•Either the atom never exploded or the atom has      
re-fused 
•Shareholders own the corporation, just as owners 
owned the pre-IPO firm 
     (Ryan, 2000) 

















What Do Shareholders Own? 
•At IPO, shareholders invest in the promise of 
maximum shareholder value within legal and moral 
constraints, in exchange for assuming the firm’s 
residual risk 
•That promise inheres in shares as they change from 
hand to hand over time 
    (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991) 
Shareholders’ Traditional Powers 
•Right to vote 
•Right to sue 
•Right to sell their shares 
Recent Shareholder Empowerment 
•Right to majority voting:  Pluralist voting has been 
replaced in 84% of U.S. corporations since 2004 
•Right to an advisory vote on CEO compensation:  
“Say on Pay” component of Dodd-Frank legislation 
•Right to private ordering of proxy access:  
Shareholders have a legal right to pass by-laws 
enabling them to nominate directors to boards 
•Empowerment has led to the Shareholder-Director 
Exchange (SDX) and new “shareholder engagement” 
programs 
•No longer passive investors 
 
CSR in the Corporate Governance Literature 
•“Shareholder-centric” vs. “Board-centric” 
governance 
•Board-centric governance presumes normative CSR 
and stakeholder theory 
•Shareholder-centric governance has gone too far and 
over-empowered investors so that they’ve focused 
boards on short-term share price 
•Power needs to be redirected from shareholders to 
the board so that shareholder interests don’t dictate 
corporate policy 
     (Stout, 2005) 
Purpose of the Board 
•Board of directors rises endogenously due to the 
residual risk bearers’ need for protection from 
managerial abuses 
•Only shareholders do not have pre-arranged 
compensation for their contributions 
•Other constituencies have other mechanisms in place 
for protecting their interests (warranties, 
employment contracts, etc.) 
      (Williamson, 1985) 
The Contested Source of CSR 
•Legal creator theory:  By granting incorporation and 
limited liability, society “creates” corporations, 
therefore corporations owe society 
•Legal recognition theory:  By granting incorporation, 
all the government does is simplify the paperwork 
and “recognize” an organization that could exist 
without it 
 
“Calls” for CSR 
• Irrelevant:  Where private profits and public interest 
are aligned 
• Ineffective:  Executives will not work for the public 
interest against shareholder interests 
                                    (Karnani, 2010) 
 
“Instrumental” vs. “Normative” CSR 
• Instrumental:  How corporations should engage in 
CSR programs in order to maximize profits within 
legal and moral constraints 
•Normative:  How corporations should engage in CSR 
programs because it’s the right thing to do, even at 
the expense of profits 
 
Impact of Normative CSR Programs 
•Going Concern:  Shareholders’ expectations are 
undermined, and owners of record at announcement 
pay for entire CSR redirection 
•Startup:  Investors purchase IPO shares with full 
knowledge of potential for lower market price 
